The conflicts between the tribal people and the settlers in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) area of Bangladesh has long been a cause of violation of human rights of the inhabitants, obstruction in the path of sustainable development, as well as ecosystem destruction, loss of biodiversity and natural resource degradation. To end this long term problem and violation in the CHT, an agreement generally known as the ‘peace accord’ was signed in 2nd December 1997 between the government of
Bangladesh and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanhiti Samiti (PCJSS—the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peoples’ Solidarity Association) However, several years after signing the accord, conflict resolution, thus sustainable development in CHT, is yet to be attained. Failure of effective implementation of the peace accord has resulted in a very critical situation at present. At the international level it has been recognized long ago that this kind of conflict should be addressed by reconciling human rights issues, indigenous rights, and environmental governance of the area. The purpose of this assignment is to review the peace accord and its status of implementation to analyze it what are the affects of the socio, economy of Bangladesh. We think thank that this peace accord create a state within the state but in the short period of time it helps to solve the problems but not long time. Present Government they mentioned in their manifesto if they go to the power they implement the peace accord but still they cannot implement the peace accord, we think this will create a big unrest in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). By 1990s, a truce was declared and after prolonged negotiations, a Peace Accord was signed between the PCJSS and the Government of Bangladesh on 2 December 1997. It was expected that the Accord would finally put an end to the hostilities and conflicts and provide a certain specific guarantee.
Geography of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
The Chittagong Hill Tracts are comprised of three hill districts—Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari. The region lies in the south-eastern part of Bangladesh and occupies a physical area of 5,093 square miles constituting 10 percent of the total land area of Bangladesh. It is situated between 21o 25’ and 23o 45’ north latitude, and between 91o 45’ and 92o 50’ east longitude. It is surrounded by the Indian states of Tripura on the north and Mizoram on the east, by Myanmar on the south and east and the Chittagong district on the west. The terrain in the CHT is part of the great hill mass—an offshoot of the Himalayan range—occupying parts of India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. The hills inside Bangladesh rise up to a maximum of 4,000 feet, with the ranges running generally northwest to southeast and dividing the area into a number of large valleys. The valleys are covered for the most part with dense virgin forest, interspersed with small waterways and swamps of all size sand description.3 The districts comprise seven valleys formed by the Feni, Karnafuli, Chengi, Myani,Kassalong, Sangu, and Matamuhuri rivers and their tributaries. There are numerous hills, ravines, and cliffs covered with dense vegetation. Geographically the CHT can be divided into two broad ecological zones: hilly valleys and agricultural plains. The CHT is a unique territory of Bangladesh with mountains and beautiful landscapes in stark contrast to the alluvial, monsoon-flooded plains of the rest of Bangladesh.
The Population of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
In the hills of the CHT, it is not only the landscapes that are dramatically different from the plains, but theoriginal inhabitants are also strikingly different from the overwhelming majority of Bengali people.
The total population of the CHT, as per the 1991 census, was approximately 974,000. Out of this number,hill people constituted 500,000 and the Bengalis 470,000.
Hill People or Tribal People
The thirteen ethnic groups living in the CHT region are of Sino-Tibetan descent belonging to Mongolian groups. There are diversities amongst the ethnic groups themselves, which have their own distinct languages, customs, religious beliefs, and systems of socio-political organization. They even choose to live in different habitats. The Chakmas, Marmas, and Tripura live in valleys. The Khumi, Murang, Lushai, Bawm, Pankhu, Kuki, Khyang, Tanchangya, Chak, and Riang live on hill ridges. Among the hill people in the CHT, the Chakmas are the most dominant and largest group, comprising about 30 percent; they are Buddhists. The Marmas, the second largest, comprising about twenty percent of the CHT population, are also Buddhists. The third largest—the Tripuras—are Hindus. The rest of the tribal people the Lushai, Pankhu and Bawm—are Christians. There are minority groups who are animists or followers of variations of various religions. The Chakmas speak a dialect close to “Chittagonian,” a dialect that is spoken by the local people of Chittagong, which is a deviation of the Bangla language. They also have a script resembling Burmese, but they seldom use the script. The Marmas speak and write using a dialect close to Burmese. The Tripura speak aversion of Tripura dialect as spoken in the Indian province of Tripura and written in Bangla script. There maining minority groups have their own dialects, but most do not have a script. Significantly, Bangla, the state language of Bangladesh, is the lingua franca for inter-tribal communication and is understood by most tribes. Thus, ethnicity has had a significant impact on these groups. They share a common trait in that they are non-Bengali. However, they have many differences that have affected their level of development and access to resources. Moreover, these differences have prevented them from speaking in one voice, with the other ethnic groups at times unwilling to accept the dominance of the Chakmas
Bengalis or Plainsmen
The Bengalis are of mixed Proto-Australoid and Caucasoid origin. The early Bengali settlement in the CHT took place during the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and the first half of the twentieth century’s for various reasons. Settlers were basically farm laborers, small businessmen, fishermen, etc. However, subsequent settlement of Bengalis during the Pakistan and Bangladesh periods was large enough to give rise to resentment and hostility. During the mid-eighteenth century; Bengali cultivators were settled in the region to work on the rajah’s land and to teach lowland farming to the Chakmas in general. During the nineteenth century only tribal chiefs were permitted to own land and the Bengali immigrants became sharecroppers.4 It was only later that some of the immigrants purchased land. Nevertheless, the Bengali population in the CHT remained small, and at the time of the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, it amounted to only about 2 percent. But after the partition the Bengali population began to rise. Since the independence of Bangladesh, Bengali settlement in the CHT has increased rapidly. The Bengalis now account for nearly half of the CHT population. This has given rise to allegations of displacement and usurpation of land.
The History of the Conflict
The historical origin of the CHT problem may be traced back to the Mogul period. The Mogul influence in the CHT became visible in the second half of the seventeenth century. The Chakma chiefs invited Bengalis to trade certain daily necessities such as dried fish, chicken, salt, tobacco, molasses, and black cloth, which were not available in the hills.5 The Chakma chief promised to pay the Mogul administrator in Chittagong for permission to trade these items. In 1724, however, Jalal Khan, the Chakma chief (the chiefs gave themselves Muslim names to appease the Mogul6), refused to pay the tribute. Consequently he was attacked by the Mogul dewan, or state minister, Kishan Chand, and fled to Arakan, where he died afterwards. By 1737 Chief Shermust Khanyielded to the Mogul authority. Under the influence of the Moguls a new administrative post designated asdewan was introduced in the Chakma tribal administration, and continued up to 1900.
Commercial relations paved the way for political power and soon the Moguls gained ascendancy. The
Payment of annual tribute, although originally agreed to voluntarily, was subsequently rejected by the Chakmachiefs. However, the tribal chiefs could do nothing to undo the damage done by the military defeat. In all likelihood, the humiliating experiences of these times became entrenched in their collective psyche, and were transmitted through generations. In 1760, Mir Qasim Ali Khan, the nawab, or deputy governor, of Bengal, ceded the area to the British East India Company. Troubles ensued in 1777, when Chief Sherdaulat Khan (1765-82) stopped payment of taxes tothe East India Company. In retaliation the company sent troops to occupy the area. During the subsequent period intermittent war took place between the two sides. Eventually, Jan Baksh Khan, Sherdaulat’s son and successor, submitted to Warren Hastings in 1785. It may be pointed out here that Jan Baksh had precipitated the crisis by prohibiting the entry of plains people into the area; and he had to submit to the English only when supplies of necessaries from the plains were stopped.
British Period
Mogul rule lasted from 1666 until 1760, when the region was ceded to the East India Company. The Chakma domination was not interfered with until the Hill Tracts Manual was introduced in the year 1901.Under the CHT Regulation of 1900, the hill tracts were divided into three revenue circles, each headed by a rajah. The three circles, known as the Chakma, the Mong, and the Bohmang, together were constituted with representatives from all tribes. A hierarchical system of authority was created, with each circle divided into mouzas (369 mouzas, each headed by a headman), and each mouza comprising a number of villages (each headed by their own karbaris). The headmen of the mouzas had the power to collect revenue, settle disputes, and allocate land for shifting cultivation.7
However, though the system introduced by the British provided for the tribal’s to administer the district, the ultimate authority rested with the British-appointed deputy commissioner. Basically, the Regulation was an imperialistic tool used to rule and exploit the tribal’s by raising revenues and taxes without impediment.8 The CHT Regulation of 1900 designated the CHT as “excluded area” and left the tribal people to themselves to help preserve minority tribal culture and heritage.
Pakistan Period
The constitution of Pakistan changed the status of the CHT from excluded area to tribal area. Since then the Bengalis started to settle in the CHT region. This period also witnessed a most devastating impact of “modernization” and “development” on the people of the CHT. The Kaptai Dam, a huge US-funded hydroelectric project, was constructed on the Karnafuli River in Rangamati, causing the displacement of a huge number of hill people, rendering 100,000 people homeless, and inundating 40 percent of the prime land.9 Even today, thousands of victims of the Kaptai Dam construction continue to languish in India as “stateless persons,” and many of them are dispersed within the CHT region as internally displaced persons.
Bangladesh Period
The constitution of Bangladesh in its preamble enunciated nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism as state principles. During the constitutional debate Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation and the then Prime Minister of the country, emphasized the exclusive primacy of Bengali culture, heritage, language, and thesacrifices made by Bengalis in the liberation struggle. The constitution declared Bangladesh as a unitary state and Bengali as the state language. The constitution also declared that citizens of Bangladesh were to be known as Bengalis. Manabendra Narayan Larma, the lone representative of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the Parliament, refused to endorse the constitution, since it did not recognize the existence of other national communities or sub-national identities.
During the constitution-making process, the demands of a hill peoples delegation under the leadership of Larma were rejected by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who urged them to become Bengalis and forget their tribal identities, and reportedly threatened to turn them into minorities in the CHT by sending Bengalis to move there.10 Bangladesh itself was the creation of a protest movement, defying the imposition of the hegemony of Pakistani nationalism, which was not flexible enough to accommodate other nationalities. It is ironic that the leadership of Bangladesh at that time not only refused to accommodate minority communities, but also imposed their own brand of nationalism upon them. However, Manabendra Narayan Larma rejected the imposition of Bengali nationalism. The failure of the state to recognize the identity of hill people and their political and economic marginalization led Larma to form the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhiti Samiti (PCJSS—the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peoples’ Solidarity Association) in March 1972. Subsequently, a military wing called Shanti Bahini was added to it. Thus the seeds of Jumma nationalism—an identity that the PCJSS now claims for the hill people—were sown.11 Shanti Bahini began its operation when they ambushed a Bangladesh military convoy in 1977. After the ambush, the CHT region was placed under the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Twenty-fourth Division of the Bangladesh Army and the Bangladesh military began counterinsurgency operations. Thus, an opportunity for accommodation and co-existence was lost and the nation was faced with what amounted to an armed insurgency movement.
Political Responses of the Governments of Bangladesh (1972-2011)
Upon its independence in 1971, Bangladesh inherited a problem in the CHT that had long historical roots, but which was exacerbated during the Pakistan period. The successive governments of Bangladesh perceived the problem in their own ways and sought solutions accordingly. However, the policies adopted by the different regimes failed to contain, curb, or bring about a cessation of hostilities.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972-1975)
The response of the Mujib government demonstrated both political and military approaches. While addressing a huge gathering at Rangamati during the 1973 election campaign, Sheikh Mujib categorically stated his government’s intention to pay attention to the special needs of the tribal’s. At the same time, he declared that from that day forward they would be considered Bengalis12—a counter-productive statement, since the tribal’s interpreted it as an invitation to surrender their distinctive identity. Eventually, in order to contain the militant insurgency movement, the government of Bangladesh deployed security forces to aid civil power, in accordance with existing laws of the country. Following the army coup of mid-1975, tribal insurgency became more aggressive, with India serving as a safe haven for the insurgents.
Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981)
The Zia regime perceived the CHT issue primarily as an economic one and held that economic development of the region would eventually undermine the appeal and strength of the movement. The Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Development Board (CHTDB) was created in January 1976, which in addition to other activities embarked on community development programs. A Multisectoral Development Program was undertaken with a view to create the necessary conditions for the longer-term socioeconomic development of the region. But with increasing militancy and armed action by the Shanti Bahini, the government was compelled to deploy armed forces in October 1976 in aid of civil law and order agencies.
As a political measure to appease the insurgents, General Zia, the president, appointed Rajmata (the mother of the Chakma king) Benita Roy as advisor to the president, later to be replaced by A.S. Prue Choudhury.
However, the political move did not produce the intended results, as both advisors belonged to the royal family and the insurgents did not have much confidence in their efficacy.
The government of Bangladesh, as a next step, looked for ways and means to build a broad-based
Consensus. On 2 July 1977, the Tribal Convention, a forum representing tribal people, was formed. The Tribal Convention held talks, preparatory to official level negotiation, for an enduring political solution that would be built on consensus. Despite initial interest in the process, the PCJSS subsequently backed out due to the party’s internal problems. However, before the government’s renewed efforts for creating conditions for dialogue to find a political solution could materialize, the process was halted due to the assassination of Ziaur Rahman in May 1981.
During 1979-81 about one hundred thousand landless Bengalis were settled in the CHT, raising the ratio of settlers to tribal’s to 27.05 percent.14 This caused great resentment among the tribal’s, especially as each settler family was allocated five acres of hilly land or four acres of mixed land composed primarily of rice land.
Justice Abdus Sattar (May 1981-March 1982)
Justice Sattar, during his short tenure, received a delegation on 5 February 1982, led by the President’s Advisor on CHT affairs, Subimal Dewan, and comprised of tribal’s and Bengalis. The discussions did not result in any concrete decision.
Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982-1990)
The Ershad government followed a three-fold approach: it continued counterinsurgency operations; it took steps to develop socioeconomic structures; and it pursued initiatives to ensure a comprehensive political settlement.
The government declared the CHT a Special Economic Area (SEA) in August 1985, with the objective of integrating tribal’s and non-tribal’s into the mainstream of economic activities. The expectation was that this would lead to an overall development of the region.
In 1982 a liaison committee, formed for communication purposes and headed by Upendra Lal Chakma, failed largely because PCJSS questioned the legitimacy of the committee. A rift in the PCJSS leadership, which was also partly responsible for the rejection of the committee, led to the killing of M.N. Larma on 10 November 1983. The Priti faction surrendered to the government on 29 April 1985, signalling an indirect victory of the policy pursued by the regime.
The Tribal Convention was revived on 30 August 1983, with the objective of creating public support for a negotiated settlement. The government announced some important measures in October 1983, including the suspension of Bengali settlement, the granting of amnesty to insurgents, and a proposal for direct dialogue with the PCJSS leadership.15 The first ever dialogue was held on 21 October 1985, as congenial conditions were created by these announcements and by the activities of the liaison committee. The dialogue proved inconsequential, but both sides undertook to continue the process.
On 9 September 1987, the government set up a National Committee for the CHT with the then Minister for Planning as the head, with the mandate to take necessary steps for resuming dialogue with PCJSS and recommend action for solving the problems.
The second dialogue, held on 17-18 December 1987, was indeed a “repeat performance.” The PCJSS put forward a five-point demand with twenty-five other detailed demands added. The government rejected these demands, as they were incompatible with the constitution of Bangladesh. Though the meeting ended in a deadlock, both sides agreed to meet again.
The third dialogue, held on 24-25 January 1988, also failed. The PCJSS refused to modify their demands as suggested by the government, who requested that they conform to the spirit and provisions of the constitution.
Both the fourth and fifth attempts at constructive dialogue during 1988 failed because both sides adhered to their earlier positions. The political strategy of involving representatives of the three hill districts in a number of meetings in the latter part of 1988 resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding. This led to a shift in the position of the PCJSS, who now called for holding the sixth dialogue.
Accordingly, on 14-15 December 1988, the sixth dialogue was held. At this dialogue PCJSS demanded “regional autonomy” in place of their earlier stance in favor of provincial autonomy. Their other demands remained unchanged. The government, while agreeing to the PCJSS position, put forward a proposal containing nine points. The PCJSS refrained from giving their decision but agreed to do so at the seventh meeting. The seventh dialogue could not be held, as the PCJSS did not make the necessary gesture by the stipulated deadline (January 1989).
The government then took some legal and executive measures. During February 1989, the Parliament enacted the Rangamati Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, the Khagrachari Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, the Bandarban Hill Tracts Local Government Council Act of 1989, and the Hill District (Repeal and Enforcement of Law and Special Provision) Act of 1989. The Special Affairs Ministry was constituted by the government in July 1990 to look after the affairs of the CHT. All of these moves led towards a positive outcome. First, a beginning was made in the direction of autonomy. Second, the smaller tribes for the first time came to be involved in the political process which had for so long been dominated by the Chakmas, the Marmas, and the Tripuras. Primary education, agriculture, and health and family planning were transferred to newly constituted district councils, which were comprised of elected tribal representatives.
Another important political initiative taken by the government to solve the CHT crisis during these years was the declaration of four general amnesties. Some 2,294 insurgent’s surrendered and 30,390 tribal’s returned from camps across the border.
Khaleda Zia (1991-1996)
The government led by Khaleda Zia declared a general amnesty for the insurgents with an offer of cash rewards for surrendering their arms. In a major policy statement made at Khagrachari on 12 May 1992, Khaleda Zia expressed the hope that it was possible to find a political solution through constitutional process and within the constitutional framework.
During July 1992, the government appointed a nine-member committee (with everyone on the committee being members of Parliament) to look into the CHT issue, with a directive to submit recommendations within two months. The government attached utmost importance to the very sensitive issue of land ownership. But decisions on the issue had to be preceded by a cadastral survey, which was extremely expensive and time consuming.
The local administration was entrusted with responsibilities for relief and rehabilitation. Since the fiscal
year 1989-90, fifty thousand families affected by insurgency had been covered under various relief and rehabilitation programs such as pacification, rehabilitation of non-tribal families, rehabilitation of tribal families, and rehabilitation of returnees from India. For the fiscal year 1992-1993, Tk. 399 million
(Approximately US $1.05 million) were allocated under these four programs.17 the three Local Government
Councils also received annual grants for development purposes, which had some positive impact on the local people and encouraged many tribal’s to return. The perceptible increase in the number of returnees was are flections of the confidence of tribal’s in the democratically elected government. The insurgency situation appeared to improve, with the PCJSS declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 10 August 1992.
The Parliamentary Committee headed by Ret. Col. Oli Ahmed for conducting negotiations with the PCJSS held seven dialogues, and a sub-committee headed by Rashed Khan Menon, Member of the Parliament, held six dialogues. But the process stopped by mid-1994, while refugee repatriation stopped by the beginning of 1995, perhaps owing to the increasing preoccupation of the ruling party with instability in the political arena.
Sheikh Hasina (May 1996-2001, 2008 to Till Now)
The Awami League in election campaigns in both 1991 and 1996 stood committed to addressing the demand for a political solution to the CHT crisis. During her election campaign in the CHT in 1996, Sheikh Hasina promised to form a “parliamentary committee” to resolve the crisis politically. It also seemed that the people of the CHT had great expectations from the Awami League government. Members of parliament from constituencies in the CHT belonged to the Awami League, which facilitated the peace deal between the two sides. On September 30, the prime minister announced the formation of an eleven-member national committee under the chairmanship of Abul Hasnat Abdullah, Chief Whip. The single objective for the committee was to suggest a way to find a “permanent political solution within the framework of the state sovereignty of Bangladesh.” During December 21-24, the first meeting took place between this committee and the PCJSS, represented by Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, also known as Shantu Larma. Unlike this first meeting, PCJSS members came to Dhaka for the remaining seven meetings, which demonstrated their confidence in the peace process.18 The historic peace accord was signed on 2 December 1997. Thus, the process of the alienation of the tribal’s that began in the early seventies gradually seemed to reach the stage of integration some twenty-five years later. Before the 2008 national election The Awami League they highlight if they elected they implement the peace accord but still not implemented. However, enduring peace appears to be elusive, and there are rumblings of dissatisfaction over the implementation of the accord.
Obligations Under the National Constitution and International Conventions and Pressure to Solve the Problem
For more than two decades the CHT area has seen much bloodshed. Innumerable young men and innocent people have lost their lives in the conflicts between the tribes and the settlers. The people of the Hill Tracts have had to endure insecurity in their lives, suffering financial and property losses in their day-to-day affairs for a long time. Although the government has to spend nearly US $ 125 million per year to suppress the rebellion through military force, it has failed to stop the unrest, violence and conflict in the area (IWGIA, 2005). Moreover, the disturbances in the area have resulted in loss of biodiversity and degradation of land. However, since the problems persist, the Government of Bangladesh is obligated to solve them from the point of view of violation of human rights, indigenous rights, and degradation of the natural environment under the national constitution, international conventions, and sustained external pressure.
Article 28 of the national constitution of Bangladesh clearly states that State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Moreover, the constitution provides equal rights to the citizens to freely move within the country, ensures freedom of speech and expression, and provides fundamental rights of security and safety of life and property of the citizen. Also, there is no scope in the constitution for granting autonomy to any region of the country.
At the international level, Bangladesh ratified the Indigenous and Populations Convention-1957 on 22 July 1972. Bangladesh also signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNCHR, 1998), Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity-1992. These agreements recognize human rights and indigenous rights in a general form. Once a country signs these agreements, it automatically accepts the obligation to establish human rights as well as the rights of indigenous people within its borders. Rights under the Indigenous and Population Convention-1957 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been briefly mentioned in the previous section. Agenda 21 (Chapter 26) describes the obligations of governments in strengthening the role of indigenous people for natural resource management. The Convention on Biological Diversity places importance on protecting and encouraging customary use of biological resources in accordance with the practices of indigenous and local communities (Colchester, 1999). As a result, Bangladesh has international obligations to establish the rights of its indigenous people as well as human rights.In addition to these, in recent years the problems of survival and development of the CHT people, particularly for the tribes, have been raised at the international level by different humanitarian groups and tribal representatives. The Survival International, UK, urged the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1992 to take action to halt the gross human rights violations against tribal people and to demilitarize the CHT. They also urged the Bangladesh Government to actively seek a peaceful political solution to the problem that recognizes and upholds the rights of the tribes to their own lands. The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs and Anti-Slavery International was concerned about the situation in the CHT and submitted a report to the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1992. They also recommended demilitarization of the area; sufficient autonomy for CHT; addressing the issue of land disputes by an impartial body; and international monitoring of the situation.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has repeatedly requested the Government of Bangladesh for further information on the steps taken to improve the situation in the area and to conduct impartial and comprehensive investigations into reported massacres of the tribes.
Moreover, the Government of Bangladesh has received financial assistance from international organizations for the resolution of the situation in CHT, for example, the European Union’s financial assistance for the resettlement of the Bengali settlers in the plains. Furthermore, the House of Representatives, Congress of the USA and the US Department of State have expressed their strong concern about the massacre and violation of human rights in the CHT and have urged the government of Bangladesh to take action to rectify the situation beyond forceful military solutions. They have particularly mentioned that the tribal people have marginal ability to influence decisions concerning the use of their lands (US Department of State, 1998). These types of indirect interventions at the international level have put pressure and obligations on the government to find a political solution to the problem in CHT.
Origin and Purpose of the Peace Accord
Following their obligations to solve the problem of the CHT area, successive governments in Bangladesh initiated discussions with various groups representing the tribal people of the CHT to explore solutions to the conflict. Many discussions for a settlement ended without any result, as neither did the government accept the demand to oust the Bengali settlers, nor did the tribal representatives relax their demand for full regional autonomy.
The previous government of Bangladesh established a Committee in October, 1996 chaired by the Chief Whip of the Bangladesh National Assembly and consisting of 12 members from the parliament to work out a solution to the problem. Following a series of meetings between the National Committee and the leaders of PCJSS along with Shanti Bahini members, an agreement, generally known as the ‘Peace Accord’, was signed between these two parties in the presence of the highest government authorities in Bangladesh on December 2,1997. This time the negotiation was successful, as the PCJSS stepped aside from their demand for full regional autonomy while on the other hand, the government agreed to withdraw the army and the illegal Bengali settlers, and to form a ‘Regional Council’ headed by a member from the tribal groups with a large degree of administrative autonomy. In this peace accord both sides had reached agreement with regard to changing, amending, incorporating and omitting the Hill District Local Government Acts-1989 and its different sections, which were in existence before the accord came into being. Following the peace accord the then head of the government of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, was awarded the Peace Prize of UNESCO for the year 1998 for her outstanding contribution towards establishing peace, development, democracy and human rights.
The purpose of the peace accord was to stop the state of insurgency, establish peace, bring tribal refugees back home, create understanding between communities in conflict with each other, expedite the socioeconomic development process, stop violation of human rights and protect the rights of the tribal people who form a minority group in the CHT area.
Salient Features of the Peace Accord
The salient features of the accord of the CHT peace accord are as follows:
Ø The accord has recognized CHT as a region populated by tribal’s, the need for preserving the particular characteristics of the region, and the need for its development.
Ø The two sides have reached agreement with regard to changing, amending, incorporating and writing off the existing three ordinances for the three hill districts--the Rangamati/Bandarban/Khagrachari Hill District Local Government Council Act-1989.
Ø The government agreed to set up a separate Ministry of CHT Affairs, to be headed by a Minister from among the tribal people.
Ø The ‘Hill District Local Government Council’ shall be renamed as ‘Hill District Council’ and will have the functions and responsibilities of land and land administration, local police, tribal law and social justice, youth welfare, environment protection and development, local tourism, irrigation, and license for local trade and commerce, jhum cultivation and money lending business.
Ø The Hill District Councils will be formed under Article 59 of the constitution which states that local government would be formed in every administrative unit of the country with people elected to such bodies. Three seats are reserved for women in each district council and two-thirds of these seats will be for tribal’s.
Ø A ‘non-tribal permanent resident’ must have legal land in the hill district and should have a specific address. Moreover, whether a person is a non-tribal shall be determined, along with the identity of non-tribal to which he belongs and no person can be a candidate for the office of the non-tribal member without a certificate from the concerned Circle Chief in this regard.
Ø The accord also provides for the formation of a ‘Regional Council’ to coordinate the development activities undertaken by the three district councils and for overseeing general administration including law and order. There would be both tribal and nontribal representatives in the regional council, but the tribal representatives would be in the majority.
Ø The Chairman of the Regional Council shall be elected indirectly by the elected members of Hill District Council from amongst the tribal’s. His status will be that of a State Minister of the government.
Ø The Council shall be constituted of twenty-five members. There shall be an elected chairman,
Ø Twelve male tribal members, two female tribal members, six male non-tribal members, and one female nontribal member. The three Chairmen of the Hill District Councils will be ex-officio members with voting rights.
Ø The members of the Regional Council will be elected by the elected members of the three Hill District Councils and the term of the council will be five years.
Ø There will be a Chief Executive Officer with the rank of a Joint Secretary to the government in the regional council and tribal’s will be preferred for appointment for this post.
Ø The Shanti Bahini rebels will surrender their arms under a general amnesty and they will receive financial assistance to return to normal life.
Ø The government will withdraw security outposts manned by the army and paramilitary forces.
Ø The tribal refugees will be rehabilitated with a sum of Taka 50 thousand per family at a time. The government will also provide two acres of land in the respective locality subject to availability of land of the landless tribal’s or the tribal’s having less than two acres of land per family. Groveland will be allocated in the case of non availability of necessary lands.
Ø A five-member Land Commission with a retired justice as its head will be constituted to settle disputes regarding lands and premises.
Ø Priority will be given to the tribal people in all kinds of appointment in all government, semi government and autonomous organizations in CHT.
In addition to these, another aspect of the peace accord is worth noting: The accord has been established without any direct external international intervention or mediation. This may be one of the reasons which makes the accord particularly significant at the international level. However, international pressure was always present and the government obliged finally.
Conflicts Regarding Peace Accord and Its Implementation Status
It has been more than fourteen years since the peace accord was signed but conflicts and disturbances still rage between the tribals and the settlers in the CHT. Since the signing of the accord, the law and order situation in CHT has deteriorated in many ways. Since the signing of the accord, the slow withdrawal of the military from the CHT also slowed the effective implementation of the accord. Though it has been stated in the accord that all the temporary camps of the army and other paramilitary forces shall be withdrawn to permanent cantonments, even after fourteen years since the signing of the accord, no time limit was fixed for such withdrawal. Only 31 temporary military camps out of more than 500 have been withdrawn so far. The army still holds the supreme authority and control over the general administration and is empowered through an administrative order named ‘Operation Uttoron’ (UNPO, 2005).
To date, only a limited number of the various provisions of the peace accord have been implemented by the government. These include enactment of laws amending the structure and powers of the three Hill District Councils, as well as an act for the newly created Regional Council of the CHT. The peace accord is in jeopardy at this moment not only because of this, but also because of improper implementation and violation of other fundamental points such as, withdrawal of Bengali settlers, rehabilitation of the Jumma refugees repatriated from India and internally displaced Jummas, settlement of the land disputes pending between the thousands of Jumma people and Bengali settlers, and restoration of the traditional land rights of the Jumma people.
Moreover, it is very important to note that the peace accord was not recognized by the then opposition party (now the ruling party) of Bangladesh on the ground that it has made ‘too many concessions to the tribal interests’ and as such the accord has like many other important issues in the country been caught in the cross confrontation of Bangladesh party politics. Thus after fourteen years of slow progress of implementation of the accord, it is not illogical to be sceptical about the policy of the present government towards the CHT and the peace accord. Furthermore, the land commission formed in 1999 in accordance with the CHT peace accord to settle and resolve land disputes, could not yet start functioning due to bureaucratic tangles. In this aspect in a recent meeting held on June 8, 2005, the commission chairman underscored the need for enactment of necessary laws for its functioning to start. From these issues it is clear that the government should be very transparent and must have the political will and sincerity to implement the provisions of the peace accord to bring justice to the CHT peoples.
A Critical Analysis of the Peace Accord from the Point of View of Reconciling the Issues of Human Rights, Indigenous Rights, and
Environmental Governance
The signing of the peace accord was a good attempt by the government to seek a political solution to the problem rather than a forceful military solution, and along with it, to protect the tribal culture and to establish their rights in CHT. However, this attempt could not make everybody happy in CHT, not even all the tribes, because certain important matters seem to have been overlooked. These are as follows
Ø One of the major deficiencies of the accord was the absence of a clear determination of the future of the Bengali settlers in CHT. The Bengalis were largely settled there due to the policies made by successive governments. The accord was specific about return of the land to the tribal’s but did not clarify the land rights of the settlers. Moreover, the issue of dispossessing the settlers from their present land, especially without adequate compensatory measures is not clear. Currently the Bengali population is almost half of the total population in CHT. If the interests of this huge number of Bengalis are neglected, a possible violation of human rights may occur as the article 36 of the constitution gives every citizen the right to move and the right to acquire, hold, transfer and otherwise dispose of property in any place of the country.
Ø The accord was signed without the consent of all the tribal people as well as the consent of the Bengali settlers in the CHT. The inadequate public participation made the accord unsatisfactory to different groups of people living there. This is one of the reasons for the failure in the formation and implementation of allocating access rights to the natural resources for different groups of people of CHT.
Ø In Part-B of Article 26 (b), the accord provides that no land, hills or forests under the control of the Hill District Council can be acquired or transferred by the government without the permission of the council. It is a good policy; however, it seems to be inconsistent with the national constitution (Article 143) and takes away the executive authority of the state to regulate the settlement, transfer or otherwise dispose state property. This contradictory issue may further bring conflict in the CHT and thus amendment is required in the constitution for effective implementation of the accord.
Ø The peace accord also made provisions for the cancellation of user rights of lands to nontribals for rubber cultivation and other purposes, which have not yet been utilized properly during the last ten years or more. This provision is good but it does not further clarify, after cancellation of the previous rights, how the provisions of allocation for new access and user rights to natural resources will be made to both the tribal and non-tribal people. It means that the accord did not properly consider the issues of environmental governance.
Ø A provision of the CHT accord says that a ‘nontribal permanent resident’ will be considered eligible to be enlisted in the voter list, if s/he, along with fulfilling other conditions imposed by the constitution, owns legally acquired lands and generally lives in the hill district at a specific address. Unlike the provisions of the CHT peace accord, constitutional preconditions do not hold that one has to be the owner of lands to become a voter in a constituency. As a result, the provision is directly in violation of the Bengali settlers’ rights to be voters, regardless of the land factor, as guaranteed by the constitution. In this case, to overcome the contradiction, perhaps a minimum number of years of residence rule could be put in place and perhaps they could vote in absentia wherever they come from.
Ø Although the Bengali population is almost half of the total population, according to the accord they are restricted to one-third representation in the Regional Council. This stands out as one of the major problems in implementing the accord, as the Bengali settlers feel they have been discriminated against through this provision.
Ø • The provision of reserving quotas for the tribal people in all kinds of government, semi-government and autonomous organizations and allocation of scholarships in the peace accord may not be able to ensure the rights of tribes in CHT; rather, it may create an opposite reaction. The World Bank group has criticized these types of policies in some other countries. They have commented that in some countries a policy of positive discrimination is adopted, reserving quotas in education and administration for indigenous people (Colchester, 1999).
Ø The peace accord did not focus on initiating reconciliation activities to remove previous communal mistrust/hatred and to ensure communal harmony among all CHT people including Bengalis and tribal’s.
Ø The peace accord has failed to initiate any measure to stop stealing and illegal trading of forest resources and killing of forest animals for the preservation of nature and the environment in CHT.
There is no doubt that the problem of CHT is very complex. The initial threats to the ethnic and cultural identity of the tribal people have been gradually compounded by government initiated nontribal settlements and demographic incursions from the lowlands. The Bengalis had started to settle there at large since the last fifty years but not illegally from their point of view as they were patronized by the successive governments. As a result, it would not be right to radically eradicate the access and user rights of the settlers.
The peace accord is a very good attempt towards solving the problem of CHT although apparently it seems that it mainly focused on establishing the rights of the tribal people. But once we look at the problem neutrally from the historical perspective, it becomes clear that justice was never in favour of the indigenous community for a long time. The tribes have been deprived of their rights, they have faced enormous trouble and suffering, and their tradition and culture is now at stake. It is obvious that there is a strong necessity for preservation and development of indigenous culture, religion and languages of different tribal people living in CHT area, as well as to protect the rights of poor and innocent Bengali settlers within the available natural resources in the area. The positive thing about the peace accord is that these basic issues were addressed, although there are some deficiencies in the accord which have been discussed in this section. These deficiencies can be overcome if the political commitment exists to effectively implement the accord along with some measures which are suggested in the following section. However, in many ways the peace accord was not totally successful in reconciling issues like human rights, indigenous rights and environmental governance of the CHT region. This might be another reason for the slow progress of implementation of the accord, and non-acceptance of the accord by some segments of the tribal people, as well as certain Bengali interest groups.
Peace Accord and Its Impact of Socio, Economic Development
Peace and the socioeconomic development of the CHT area are interrelated. The United Nations global conferences from Rio in 1992 to Rome in 1996 have highlighted the crucial links between peace, development and human rights in any area of the world (UNDP, 1998). Also, at the international level it has been recognized long ago that the settlement of environmental and natural resource disputes should be addressed by the recognition of individual human rights and the protection of the environment (Gormley, 1976). Furthermore, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and the 1995 World Summit for Social Development highlighted the importance of an integrated approach to social advancement (UNDP, 1998). At the international level, it has been reiterated many times that human rights, peace, sustainable development and the protection of the environment are interdependent and indivisible. Moreover, the protection of land and resource rights of the indigenous community is closely related to the achievement of sustainable development.
To justify the importance of reconciliation of the issues of human rights, indigenous rights and environmental governance in the peace accord, it is necessary to have a clear concept of these terminologies. Human rights are essential for the well being of every human being. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets the civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights of each human being through a set of articles (UNHCHR, 1998). Included among these are the right to life, liberty and security; the right not to be discriminated against (discriminating in property and resources on the grounds of ethnicity is condemned); the fundamental rights granted by the constitution or by law; the right of equal access to public service; the right to vote, and to freedom of speech and freedom of the press; the right to be free from arbitrary invasion of privacy, family or home; and legal rights such as the right to due process of law.
For the protection of indigenous minority groups, specific indigenous rights were also established to ensure the enjoyment of their own culture, religion and language through the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention in 1957 (ILO, 1999). This includes the right of the indigenous people to control their lands and territories, to maintain their traditional way of living, and the right to security. Moreover, the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People emphasizes that indigenous people shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories and that they have rights to the conservation, restoration and protection of the total environment and the productive capacity of their lands (Article 10 and 28) (UNCHR, 1993). Since the indigenous groups are outnumbered and marginalized in many places of the world, the above mentioned international treaties and agreements place special emphasis on protecting ethnic diversity and their cultural norms and values. Even Agenda-21 (Chapter 26) places special emphasis on indigenous people and recognizes the need to establish their rights to attain peace and sustainable development in a region (UNCED, 1992). This justifies the purpose of separating human rights from indigenous rights. Actually human rights are part of indigenous rights but as mentioned earlier, the latter provides special attention to the aboriginal groups where they have become marginalized, to restore their ancestral lands, properties and culture as well as their rights as human beings.
Environmental governance means governing peoples access to nature and natural resources (Conca, 1995). Environmental governance offers a system which establishes reciprocal relationships between people relating to access and use of environmental goods and services and binds them to certain specific environmental ethics. The rules, rights and responsibilities may either flow from custom and practice or be codified in such instruments as conventions, treaties or statutes managed by different organisational forms. Furthermore, the concept of environmental governance provides the flexibility to determine and establish a variety of appropriate institutional systems to decide on the allocation of environmental resources (Mugabe and Tumushabe, 1999). In other words, environmental governance considers the environment and natural resources and the institutional responses needed to manage them (Hempel, 1996). Thus, by considering the issues of environmental governance, we can incorporate into the existing and new institutional arrangements the provisions of allocations of access and use rights to natural resources. In this way it has been recognized at the international level that to ensure peace and sustainable development in a region, the solution should be sought within a framework, which connects human rights, indigenous rights and environmental governance in a holistic and integrated way. At the national level, the Forum of Environment and Sustainable Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts adopted the ‘Rangamati Declaration’ on 19 December, 1998, bearing in mind the Rio Conference on Environment and Development (Roy and Halim, 2001). In their declaration, they suggested measures which recognize an integrated approach for the establishment of rights of tribes as well as settlers, and the protection of environment like land, water bodies, biodiversity, forestry, mineral resources and public health simultaneously for speedy implementation of the peace accord.
From the above discussion, it should become clear that the issues of human rights, indigenous rights and environmental governance are so interrelated and interdependent that they need to be reconciled via new institutional arrangements (such as the Peace Accord of 1997) to bring peace for further development of the CHT area. It is necessary to establish a balance between the interests of the tribal people and those of the nontribal people within the available natural resources. By realizing the importance of the issue of reconciliation, this assignment has reviewed the existing ‘peace accord’ of the CHT within an analytical framework where human rights of the settlers, indigenous rights of the tribal people, and environmental governance of the CHT region have been addressed holistically to obtain positive results
Recommendations
The purpose of bringing peace in the CHT through any new institutional arrangement (such as the peace accord of 1997) is to improve the livelihoods of the communities, removing previous communal mistrust and ensuring communal harmony among all CHT people, initiating legal awareness raising programs for the tribal as well as the non-tribal people, undertaking voter education programs that may ensure a meaningful and effective local leadership, and inspiring tribal and non-tribal youths towards more sporting and cultural activities.
National level
Ø Treat the issue as one of utmost national importance, considering the integrity and security of state boundaries, and try to create a national and broad-based consensus in favor of the accord.
Ø Make policy decisions and takes concrete steps so that the implementation of the accord is independent of changes in government.
Ø Undertake effective measures to recover all arms.
Ø Create conditions to make the accord functional and operational, constituting the bodies mentioned in the accord, such as the Land Commission.
Ø Take all measures to maintain law and order in the region.
Ø Take steps to settle all internally displaced persons, tribal’s, or settlers.
Ø Design development plans, while keeping in special focus the different needs and problems of the CHT as compared with the rest of the country.
Local level
Ø Promote education of both boys and girls.
Ø Encourage social interaction between the tribal’s and settlers, especially through sports and cultural activities, keeping in view the distinctiveness of tribal culture.
Ø Make land surveys to establish ownership by using machinery provided under the peace accord.
Ø Create opportunities for employment and income generation, so that the poverty level is reduced
Ø Provide public health facilities and raise consciousness about the matter.
Ø Provide leadership training and enhance mediation skills through training of the local government
Ø Institutions and members of Parliament.
Ø Preserve the cultural, social, and environmental heritage of the hill people.
Ø Take into account the special needs of the people, keeping in view the need for harmony and peace between
Ø The tribal’s and the Bengalis, while drawing up development projects.
Ø Encourage NGOs, especially those dealing with primary education, sanitation and healthcare and legal
Ø Literacy, to undertake projects involving both tribal’s and settlers.
Conclusion
The ‘peace accord’ was signed with good intention but so far the progress of implementation of the peace accord of CHT is very slow. To date, in-migration of Bengali settlers, forcible occupation of the lands of tribal people, and acts of violence against them are still taking place in the region. The accord incorporated a number of agreements involving a certain redistribution of power between the national government and the Regional Council, as well as partial delegation of authority to the latter by the former in specific subject areas. The accord was a very good attempt for preservation and development of indigenous culture, religion and language of different tribal people living in the CHT area, as well as to protect the rights of poor and innocent Bengali settlers with the available natural resources. That means, the accord was primarily successful in reconciling issues like human rights, indigenous rights and environmental governance. However, as mentioned earlier in terms of the extent of the implementation of the accord, it was not very successful for reasons such as lack of commitment from the government, reluctance of withdrawing of military force from the region, absence of by-laws, non-function of the land commission etc. To solve the continuing conflicts and to bring peace and harmony to the CHT area, integrated planning and implementation through effective participation of the tribes and Bengali settlers is a precondition.
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